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1) How would you define the topic of your research and how did you get around to 
working on it? 
I was initially trained as a psychologist, with a focus on child development. I was interested in 
the work of the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget and, like many people, was attracted to his 
idiosyncratic combination of empirical work on children with philosophical and biological questions. At 
some point, I began to suspect that something was wrong or fundamentally incomplete about the 
official accounts of his intellectual development, which were all based on his own short 
autobiographies. As I started investigating, I discovered archival materials of all sorts, and these 
materials revealed the young Piaget’s deep political and religious commitments. This religious and 
political dimension was crucial for understanding his vocation, his ideas and his work up to at least 
the 1930s. I suppose it was at the time of doing this research —which led to a book called Piaget 
Before Piaget— that the main theme of my work evolved into the articulation of knowledge and 
values in the history of the human sciences, or perhaps more precisely: the history of how notions of 
the human being are embedded in the human sciences. 
I’ve worked on many topics, such as the concept of psychology and the transformation of the 
sciences of the soul in the early modern era, sexuality in the Enlightenment, miracles and science in 
the same periods, and the history of the progressive education movement in the 20th century, to 
mention just a few. Surely they might seem too many different topics, but, especially in retrospect, it’s 
clear to me that their common leitmotif is the nexus between knowledge and values. This is also the 
case of my work less directly connected to the history of the human sciences. I am thinking of three 
large-scale collaborative projects that resulted in the edited volumes The Moral Authority of Nature,  
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with Lorraine Daston; Believing Nature, Knowing God, with Bernhard Kleeberg; and Endangerment, 
Biodiversity and Culture, with Nélia Dias, a book that has just come out in the series “Environmental 
Humanities” of Routledge. One way or another (the specifics are of course all very different) these 
volumes investigate the constitutive role that values (and actually also emotions) play in the 
production of historically-situated knowledge across disciplines, across cultures, and over a long time 
span. 
2) What brought you to study the neurosciences? 
Well, I wouldn’t say that I “study the neurosciences,” because the details of those sciences and 
their history don’t play a central role in my work. This is easy to explain. As I said, I’m interested in 
the intellectual and cultural history of views about the nature of the human, and in how these views 
are embodied in scientific and extra-scientific discourses and practices. In the Western Christian 
tradition, which has been my focus, those views involve discussions about the definition of 
personhood and personal identity, about the role of physical and psychological features (or material 
and immaterial substances), and also about the significance of relationships and communities. And 
this brought me to the brain.  
Until the late 17th century, the Christian tradition emphasized that persons are inherently 
corporeal beings. Showing how and in which contexts this changed in the early modern period 
provides answers to questions such as: How did the brain become the only organ we apparently 
need in order to be ourselves? Why does it seem so natural (at least in Anglo-American philosophy 
starting in the late 1960s) to discuss personal identity using thought experiments about brains in vats 
and brain transplantations? In short, what made Roland Puccetti’s unforgettable statement “Where 
goes a brain, there goes a person” possible? Neuroscientists’ answers rely on a triumphalist vision of 
neuroscientific progress: we now know that we are our brains, that the soul doesn’t exist, that a brain 
transplant would actually be a full-body transplant, and so on. 
I’d argue that things happened the other way around: when personhood and personal identity 
were “psychologized” in the late 17th century, they also were “cerebralized.” This happened because 
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it was known that functions like memory and consciousness —by which the “modern self” came to be 
defined— were somehow located inside the head. That immediately turned human beings into 
“cerebral subjects.” No particular knowledge of the brain was necessary to believe this, because the 
belief resulted from a philosophical redefinition of personhood. But this redefinition increased the 
significance of brain research, motivated it, and has sustained it ever since. This is not to deny the 
immense advances of neuroscientific knowledge, but it serves to relativize claims such as those by 
Rafael Yuste, head of the US BRAIN project, who recently told the Spanish newspaper El País that 
once it understands the brain, humanity will “understand itself from the inside.” Yuste also announced 
that the neurosciences will revolutionize the whole of culture, and anticipated the advent of a “new 
humanism.” We’ve been hearing similar prophecies since the 1990s, and the large amount of 
research on neuroscience and society produced by the humanities and the social and human 
sciences has not managed to demystify them in the eyes of politicians or the general public or, for 
that matter, in the eyes of those scholars in the human sciences who believe that their fields require a 
“neural turn.” There is considerable lucidity and skepticism both inside and outside the 
neurosciences. However, the hype keeps selling, and the fact that so many neuroscientists, scholars 
from various disciplines, and science popularizers throughout the world (Argentina included) keep 
playing this game strikes me as a large-scale moral failure that calls for a radical overhaul of the 
global system of science. Unlikely to happen! 
3) Your latest work focuses on so-called “neurocultures.” First of all, what do you 
understand by “neurocultures”? Second, can this line of your investigation be inscribed in a 
relatively new field called “critical neuroscience,” considering the scope and tools of this 
recently developed discipline? 
“Neurocultures” —a word that appears in the title of a book Francisco Ortega and I edited in 
2011— is basically a practical term for capturing the diverse forms “neuro” discourses and practices 
have assumed in contemporary society. This goes from the official redefinition of mental illnesses as 
“brain disorders” to the growth of disciplines with names like neuroanthropology, neuroaesthetics, 
neuroethics, neurohistory, neurolaw, neuromarketing or neurotheology, to the emergence of a 
“neurodiversity” movement, to businesses such as the fMRI lie detector or the multimillion-dollar 
brain-training industry. (By the way, it is revealing of the present state of society that this industry has 
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continued to thrive even though several large-scale studies have demonstrated its inefficacy). But I 
don’t think my work on neurocultures really belongs in the field of critical neuroscience. Critical 
neuroscience is largely internal to the neurosciences themselves, and responds to criticism by 
improving things from the inside. For example, a programmatic text published in German last January 
(which just appeared in Spanish in Mente y Cerebro) proposed “nine ideas for a better neuroscience.” 
The authors called for more rigorous sampling and statistical techniques, for turning the publication of 
negative results and replication studies into more common scientific practices, for a reform of the 
evaluation and peer review systems, and overall for more self-criticism.  
While these suggestions are valuable, they leave intact the core problem, which is the 
conviction that we are essentially our brains. If you are convinced that, as a prominent figure of 
neuroethics put it, “imaging the brain provides information about the mind,” then you can keep doing 
neuroaesthetics or neurotheology, and seek funding to develop more powerful imaging technologies, 
work with larger samples, and train researchers better. My point of view is different, and has in fact 
become increasingly so the more I studied the “neuro” universe: imaging provides information about 
the brain, not about the mind; a relevant study into aesthetic or spiritual experience barely begins at 
the point where neuroaesthetics or neurotheology leave off. In a review of Steven Pinker’s The Blank 
Slate published in The New Yorker in 2010, the Harvard cultural historian Louis Menand wrote: 
“every aspect of life has a biological foundation in exactly the same sense, which is that unless it was 
biologically possible it wouldn’t exist. After that, it’s up for grabs.” This would require a lot of 
elaboration (and some of it will be provided in Being Brains, my forthcoming book with Francisco 
Ortega), but Menand captures exactly the point: the neuroscientific level of analysis is generally 
inappropriate for explaining complex human phenomena, and not all phenomena involving the 
mind/brain lend themselves equally well to neuroscientific analysis. Since this observation seems to 
me a matter of common sense, I’m always surprised by the resistance it provokes. In conclusion, as 
far as your question is concerned: critical neuroscience may be critical, but it is still neuroscience; the 
study of “neurocultures” as I practice it takes place on the other side of the fence. 
4) The notion of “brainhood”, a term you coined, is central to your research. How would 
you explain this concept and its relevance for your investigations?  
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The term “brainhood” is patterned after “personhood”: if personhood is the quality of being a 
person, brainhood is the quality of being a brain. This term seemed a good name for the notion of the 
human being whose history I’ve been studying. Some colleagues have questioned the “existence” of 
brainhood because, as they correctly note, people don’t consider themselves literally as their brains. 
But they reduce “existence” to the beliefs of individuals, and miss the following point: I’m not claiming 
that brainhood represents a hegemonic way of being; rather, I explore the history and functioning of 
what I call an “anthropological figure,” that is to say, a way of understanding what human beings 
fundamentally are. In real life, people sometimes see themselves as “cerebral subjects” and act 
accordingly; sometimes they don’t, but even then it may happen that they are considered as such, 
and that has a concrete impact. For example, when public health agencies declare that mental 
illnesses are actually brain disorders, that claim has consequences for reimbursable diagnoses and 
treatments, and therefore on people’s real lives. In the perspective of a longue-durée history of 
notions and practices of personhood and personal identity, brainhood represents a crucial juncture. 
5) It has been alleged that neurosciences have close ties to neoliberal political ideas. How 
would you assess this statement? 
I tend to keep away from such statements. It doesn’t seem to me that studying the brain as a 
scientific endeavor has intrinsic ties to any political outlook or even a particular view of the human. 
Although a certain measure of methodological reductionism is necessary, the ideology of brainhood 
is not intrinsic to the brain sciences, and neither are right- or left-wing politics. Almost any science or 
scientific result can be instrumentalized in favor or against any political view, and reciprocally, almost 
any political view can absorb almost any scientific result. This doesn’t look that way given American 
conservatives’ negative reaction to Pope Francis’ “environmental encyclical,” which is heavily 
informed by science. But in fact, what they really dislike is the Pope’s social and political message. In 
the neurocultural world, a good example is provided by the notion of “neuroplasticity,” a term that 
designates the brain’s ability to change as a result of experience, and also to recover and repair itself, 
and self-reprogram after injury. Neuroplasticity has been celebrated as a revolutionary finding, and is 
exploited by a large spectrum of interested individuals, including brain-fitness dealers, philosophers, 
political scientists, psychiatrists, rehabilitation specialists, and researchers in areas such as 
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neuroeducation and cultural neuroscience. Politically too, it can be stretched in any direction you 
want. At one end, it seems to reflect the neoliberal emphasis on autonomy and self-responsibility, on 
individuals’ personal initiative and self-realization provided they don’t ask anything from the state and 
remain economically productive. It apparently makes flexibilization acceptable, with its sequel of 
precarious jobs and the freedom to lay off workers. But at the other end, the existence of 
neuroplasticity is presented as a liberating fact, as a feature that allows us to freely “make” and 
“sculpt” our brains, and “change our life” however we freely choose. I don’t adhere to any of these 
interpretations, but mention them to underline that, like most major trends or worldviews one can 
identify in history, the phenomena we label “neurocultures” and “neoliberalism” are formidably elastic. 
Talking about ties between the neurosciences and neoliberalism is perhaps interesting if it is based 
on the detailed analysis of concrete cases and given a restricted meaning, but not if taken as a 
totalizing framework. 
6) Which area or areas of neuroscience research do you consider most relevant for socio-
historical and sociological research?  
It depends on what one means by “relevant.” If relevance boils down to confirming that there 
are neural correlates to all and any behavior that may come into consideration in socio-historical and 
sociological research, then the answer is that neuroscientific research is for the most part irrelevant. 
Unfortunately, this is mainly what one gets out of the results obtained since the 1990s, which is when 
neuroimaging began to be applied to questions traditionally associated with the humanities and the 
social sciences, and gave rise to the “neuro” disciplines I mentioned before. For the reasons already 
mentioned, I don’t think such a situation can change: irrelevance is intrinsic to those “neuro” 
endeavors. I’m not claiming that everything the humanities and the social sciences say is relevant, 
but that there is where there are better chances for understanding the most complex human 
phenomena. Let us take one of the “toughest cookies” in the domain of mental health: MDD, or major 
depressive disorder. Nature just published [July 2015] an article announcing the identification, for the 
first time, of genetic markers reproducibly linked to MDD. This is potentially important, since MDD is 
one of the leading causes of disability globally. But since you may have these markers and not 
develop MDD, as well as develop MDD without those markers, the significance of neurogenomics is 
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extremely limited unless accompanied by evidence of the sort that can only be provided by the 
human and social sciences. And the same can be said about complex phenomena for which the 
necessary anatomical and physiological conditions have been established. We need certain types of 
specialized neurons to perceive straight lines; but since these neurons operate alike irrespective of 
whether we look at a fence or a canvas by Mondrian, knowing about them says preciously little about 
experiencing a Mondrian painting as art (or rather, as object of an aesthetic relation). This seems to 
me obvious, and that is why, together with a few enlightened neuroscientists, I take the “neural turn” 
in the human and social sciences to be an intellectual dead end, even if it has been institutionally 
successful. 
7) Ideally, then, what kind of a relationship do you imagine between neurosciences on the 
one hand, and humanities and social sciences on the other?  
“Ideally,” I imagine a relationship of mutual respect and equilibrium. But there is very little to 
suggest that this is possible. In an interview given in 2008, the director of a Max Planck Institute 
affirmed that the human sciences had failed to say anything significant about beauty because they 
don’t carry out empirical research, and he demanded that they show “courage on the long way to 
knowledge.” The ignorance and contempt of such a statement are shocking, but they are not an 
exception. In milder, less explicit, and in any case less arrogant forms, they characterize a lot of the 
research of the “neuro” disciplines, which barely takes into account the work the human sciences 
have done on the topics they claim to be dealing with (beauty or aesthetic experience, to stay with 
the example). In a way this is understandable, since their goal is ultimately to replace the soft 
“descriptions” and “interpretations” of the human sciences with the harder “explanations” and the 
more “objective” analysis of the neurosciences. In contrast, when philosophers, sociologists, 
anthropologists or historians publish something involving the neurosciences, they have, to the best of 
their abilities, studied them and tried to understand them: a simple comparison of bibliographies is in 
this respect very revealing. Ideally, then, we should give up the prevailing and profitable but deceitful 
and intellectually unproductive discourse about interdisciplinarity. We should of course collaborate 
and remain open to learning from each other, but we should also let each discipline approach the 
world with its own evolving conceptual and empirical toolboxes.  
Revista Culturas Psi/Psy Cultures 
        Buenos Aires, setiembre 2015, Nº5, 5-12 
ISSN 2313-965X, culturaspsi.org 
	  
	  
	   12 
 
8) What concrete “real life” applications do you imagine neurosciences can contribute to 
improve individuals’ lives and life in society at large?  
There are quite a few areas of application, some better substantiated than others. Brain 
training isn’t substantiated at all, but there are well-documented possibilities for cognitive 
enhancement or memory manipulation. The most desirable applications are most likely to be in 
medicine. A lot is known about the pathogenic mechanisms of many disorders, and in a world of 
ageing populations and increasing numbers of people suffering from dementia or cognitive 
impairment, the neurosciences have a crucial role to play. But therapeutic applications are largely in 
the distant future; and that is even more the case with conditions such as depression. It seems to me 
that whatever “applications” the neurosciences have in the domain of health and disease, we must 
recognize that mental disorders are not, as often claimed, “just like diabetes.” And to proclaim that 
the neurosciences will bring about “revolutionary” changes in self-understanding and in legal and 
educational systems is to engage in a self-serving false prophecy. The neurosciences, like other 
sciences, can inform views and decisions in those domains. But the views and the decisions 
themselves are moral, political, or philosophical, even if they are often masked as technical and 
justified as being evidence-based. Ultimately, recognizing this will benefit the neurosciences 
themselves. 
	  
